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Abstract 
We explore the influence of ownership and governance on financial performance in a sample 
of 200 UK family firms. This study is the first to explore the governance role of trusts and 
indicates that the presence of trusts lead to a significant reduction in the growth and 
profitability of family firms. Trusts therefore deserve much greater research attention in the 
future. 
Introduction 
Governance and ownership configurations and characteristics have been shown to directly 
influence the financial and strategic decisions made by family firms as well their performance 
(Chrisman, Sharma, Steier, & Chua, 2013; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). The board of 
directors is arguably the most important part of governance structures and can vary 
considerably among family firms. It can be in the form of ‘family board’ or a ‘professional 
board’ with or without NEDs, small or large, or without appropriate skills/experience 
(Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). Ownership is equally important in family firms where, in the 
beginning, the founding family are the main equity holder and main decision makers. As the 
firm grows, ownership can be transferred to extended family and non-family members, either 
through succession or through bringing in non-family talent to the organization. Some family 
members with equity may be involved in the business, some may not (Le Breton-Miller & 
Miller, 2013).   
An interesting and completely unexplored area of family firm governance, however, 
is the use of trusts. Trusts in the UK are established by some family business owners to allow 
assets (shares) to be transferred to the trustees who are usually the descendants of the owner 
or the employees (Scholes & Wilson, 2014). Trusts are important from a governance 
perspective because as significant or majority shareholders the trustees appoint the board of 
directors of the family company and have a duty to ensure that the assets of the business are 
managed in a way that provides maximum benefits to the family as beneficiaries (Allcock & 
Filatotchev, 2010). Trustees in some of the larger family firms can also be regarded as ‘quasi 
directors’ as they meet with directors regularly and therefore have significant influence and 
over the running of the business (Scholes & Wilson, 2014).  
The neglect of the phenomenon of family firm trusts represents a problematic gap in 
our knowledge of family firm performance, their governance, and the effects of that 
governance. Those family firms with trusts may then operate in quite different ways than 
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might be expected or prescribed in the current literature on family firms and therefore present 
a challenge to what the literature can currently say about the effects of governance on family 
firm performance. This article explores the impact of selected aspects of the board of 
directors, the share ownership, and the presence of trusts on the growth and profitability of a 
sample of UK family firms.  
Boards, Ownership and Trusts  
Boards in family firms are importance as they can influence the family firm performance 
through providing guidance on the mission and goals of the organization, advice on the 
strategic direction, provide useful contacts, monitor the CEO and company performance 
(Pearce & Zahra, 1991). However, smaller family firm boards may not have the necessary 
skills to guide the family business because of dominant role of the CEO and family members 
within it. Furthermore, due to the insular nature and in-group-out-group perception of many 
smaller family firms they may exclude the presence of non-family outsiders or at least a 
larger pool of talent. This can inhibit the important decision making and decision control 
functions of the board (Bammens, Voordeckers & Gils, 2008; Carney et al., 2014). We 
hypothesise therefore that: 
H1a Larger boards will promote growth of the family firm. 
H1b Larger boards will enhance profitability of the family firm. 
Trustees can be family members, typically the founder of the business in the first 
instance, and/or trusted advisers and/or close family friends. Broadly, trustees serve as voting 
shareholders as well as ‘quasi’ directors’. These roles involve trustees voting and electing 
suitable directors and as well as serving as directors themselves with strong relationships with 
existing board members and influence over firm strategy. Therefore, trustees can be faced 
with a conflict of interest which can be thought of as multiple agency or double agent conflict 
(Allcock & Filatotchev, 2010; Arthurs et al., 2008; Bruton et al. 2010; Child & Rodrigues, 
2003; Chrisman et al., 2012). In such situations the objectives of the trustees are more aligned 
with the management of the firm, the directors, their focus may be on wealth maximization 
resulting in a focus on increasing the firm size (Bruton et al., 2010). This yields the following 
hypothesis: 
H2a The presence of a trust will enhance the growth of the family firm. 
Conversely if the trustees objectives are aligned with the other 
shareholders/beneficiaries their focus will be to enhance shareholder value by enhancing the 
value of the company by for example increasing the profitability of the firm without taking 
unnecessary risks associated with growth (Allcock & Filatotchev, 2010). 
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H2b The presence of a trust will enhance the profitability of the family firm. 
Additionally the percentage of shares in a trust will determine the power of the trust. As the 
percentage increases the effects on the performance may become more prominent. Wherefore 
we hypothesize that: 
H2c As the % shares in the trust increase the effect on the performance will be greater 
The effects of ownership have been explored particularly in relation to whether the 
owner is also the founder of the firm (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) where in general performance 
of founder firms has been shown to be better than later generation firms (Molly, Laveren & 
Deloof, 2010). In this study we focus on the extent to which share ownership of the lead 
owner affects performance and secondly if the lead owner is also a manager whether this has 
a bearing on performance. The level of equity ownership of the lead owner is expected to 
have a positive effect on performance as is the case when the lead owner is the manager. This 
is expressed more formally as follows: 
H3a Greater share ownership of lead owner leads to better family firm performance 
H3b Owner/manager status of lead owner will lead to better family firm performance 
Method 
Data comprised of a sample of over 200 family firms selected from the Bureau Van Dyke 
database FAME. All firms were privately owned, employed between 50 and 100 employees, 
had an ultimate owner of the family, and half had trusts in place. All firms were individually 
checked to ensure that one or more shareholder(s) had the same surname. 
Measures 
Profitability was measured using the return on capital employed in the year 2013 
(Return on Capital Employed %2013), while growth was measured using the change in 
employees between 2010 and 2013 measured as a percentage change (EmpChange10to13). 
The variable DirectorNo measures the number of directors on the board in the year 2013. 
Trust, measures whether a family firm had a trust in place or not. TotTrust% is the % of 
total shares owned by the trust, while ContShare% is the % of shares owned by the lead 
shareholder. OwnerMan, indicates whether the owner manager is a lead shareholder or not. 
Additionally, Generation was used as control measure to assess whether the firm is a first or 
second generation firm. Descriptives for the trust versus no trust group are shown in Tables 1 
(continuous variables) and 2 (categorical variables).  
Results 
In terms of the growth of the firm (Table 3) the model itself is not significant (sig = 0.146), 
there is no multicollinearity (tolerance/VIF stats) and the model accounts for a small amount 
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of variance in the dependent variable (R2 = 0.021). The number of directors (DirectorNo), 
whether the family firm had a trust (Trust), and the size of the trust (TotTrust%) are all 
significant. The number of directors is positively related to growth, and weakly significant, 
which gives some support for H1a on the importance of board size. The presence of a trust is 
negative and significant (sig = 0.042) so suggests that growth is greater in family firms that 
do not have trusts. This finding is backed up by the mean % change in employees in Table 1 
which is 7.0% for firms without a trust and 2.7% for firms with a trust. This finding does not 
support our hypothesis H2a. The size of the trust is positive and significant (sig = 0.03) 
indicating that as the trust becomes larger (in terms of % shares) the influence on 
performance becomes larger thus providing support for hypothesis H2c.  
In terms of the return on capital employed, the measure of profitability (Table 4), the 
model itself is significant (sig = 0.025), there is no multicollinearity (tolerance/VIF stats), 
and the model accounts for a small amount of variance in the dependent variable (R2 = 
0.038). Whether the family firm has a trust (Trust), and the generation of the firm 
(Generation) are significant. The presence of a trust is negative and significant (sig = 0.03) 
so suggests that profitability is greater in family firms that do not have trusts. This finding is 
supported by the return on capital employed in Table 1 which is 19.0% for firms without a 
trust and 10.2% for firms with a trust. This finding does not support our hypothesis H2b but 
nevertheless indicates that trusts have a significant effect on profitability, albeit not as we 
predicted, and are therefore important. Generation is negative and significant (sig = 0.042) 
indicating that profitability is greater in first generation firms. There is no support in either 
dependent variable model for greater share ownership and owner/manager status H3a or 
H3b. There is no support for H1b. 
 Table 1. Descriptives (continuous variables) 
 
Trust N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
no EmpChange10to13 71 -86.36 221.74 7.0460 38.14021 
Return on Capital Employed 
%2013 102 -46.6 147.8 19.030 26.1212 
DirectorNo 106 1 7 3.45 1.339 
TotTrust% 106 .00 .00 .0000 .00000 
ContShare% 106 50.10 100.00 74.7912 16.58422 
OwnerMan 106 .00 1.00 .7075 .45705 
Generation 106 1.0 2.0 1.057 .2322 
TurnoverGBP2013 102 116950.0 98811000.0 14570055.6 16016867.4 
Number of Employees2013 100 4.0 110.0 49.250 27.3508 
Gearing%2013 96 .0 963.4 77.579 148.0798 
Valid N (listwise) 68     
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yes EmpChange10to13 104 -94.29 120.00 2.7221 26.79905 
Return on Capital Employed 
%2013 124 -126.5 107.8 10.170 22.2225 
DirectorNo 126 1 9 4.26 1.726 
TotTrust% 125 .01 51.00 17.2993 13.99298 
ContShare% 126 50.20 100.00 70.3810 15.72421 
OwnerMan 125 .00 1.00 .6960 .46183 
Generation 126 1.0 2.0 1.254 .4370 
TurnoverGBP2013 125 317300.0 75585000.0 13604791.2 13540560.5 
Number of Employees2013 125 2.0 145.0 62.416 30.1786 
Gearing%2013 112 .0 637.0 66.986 102.9993 
Valid N (listwise) 93     
 
Table 2. Frequencies (categorical variables) 
OwnerMan 
Trust Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
no Valid no 31 29.2 29.2 29.2 
yes 75 70.8 70.8 100.0 
Total 106 100.0 100.0  
yes Valid no 38 30.2 30.4 30.4 
yes 87 69.0 69.6 100.0 
Total 125 99.2 100.0  
Missing System 1 .8   
Total 126 100.0   
Generation 
Trust Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
no Valid first 100 94.3 94.3 94.3 
second 6 5.7 5.7 100.0 
Total 106 100.0 100.0  
yes Valid first 94 74.6 74.6 74.6 
second 32 25.4 25.4 100.0 
Total 126 100.0 100.0  
 
Table 3. Governance and Ownership vs. Employee Growth in Family Firms 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) -8.410 16.708  -.503 .615   
DirectorNo 2.879 1.549 .147 1.858 .065 .902 1.109 
Trust -13.466 6.587 -.208 -2.044 .042 .547 1.827 
TotTrust% .551 .252 .225 2.191 .030 .536 1.865 
ContShare% .178 .168 .087 1.058 .292 .838 1.193 
OwnerMan -5.141 5.269 -.074 -.976 .331 .986 1.014 
Generation -4.501 6.288 -.056 -.716 .475 .923 1.083 
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a. Dependent Variable: EmpChange10to13 
 
Table 4. Governance and Ownership vs. ROCE in Family Firms 
Coefficientsa 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 39.494 10.973  3.599 .000   
DirectorNo -.611 1.066 -.040 -.572 .568 .901 1.110 
Trust -9.689 4.446 -.197 -2.179 .030 .526 1.902 
TotTrust% .156 .167 .087 .936 .350 .505 1.982 
ContShare% -.115 .110 -.076 -1.046 .297 .824 1.214 
OwnerMan .031 3.579 .001 .009 .993 .986 1.014 
Generation -9.236 4.520 -.140 -2.044 .042 .915 1.093 
a. Dependent Variable: Return on Capital Employed %2013 
 
Discussion 
Board size and the presence of trusts were found to be most important where higher growth is 
associated with larger boards and lower growth and profitability is associated with the 
presence of family firm trusts. The reasons for the effect of trusts have not been explored here 
but it is possible to speculate that as shareholders the trustees may be risk averse. Trustees are 
often lawyers with their own reputations and those of their firm at stake so they may advise 
boards against risky innovative projects or acquisitions. These decisions and influences may 
ultimately harm the development of the firm. On the other hand although these firms are not 
developing as fast as the firms without trusts, the impact of trusts on survival in the long term 
is not yet known. It is possible that survival is enhanced in firms that have trusts. This is the 
first article to explore the role of trusts in family firms. We join recent calls to in literature to 
examine the influence of trusts on family firm performance and outcomes (Scholes & Wilson, 
2014). Our research suggests that board size and trusts have a financial impact on family 
businesses and therefore that trusts, in particular, deserve much greater research attention.  
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